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Status differentiation in Roman business circles is mostly treated as a common fact. Some 
traders or financiers were rich, others poor, some were freedmen, others freeborn, some 
belonged to the aristocracy and operated through middlemen, others sailed the seas and 
remained the archetypal outsiders looked upon with distrust by urban communities across 
the empire. Many have stressed that the ambitions of wealthy businessmen to enter the 
aristocracy lead to a process of anticipatory socialisation by which upstart businessmen 
strove to adopt the behavioural codes and values of the aristocracy to be more readily 
accepted in the ranks of the latter.1 Beyond this basic and undoubtedly correct observa-
tion, however, analysis of the ways in which differences in sub-aristocratic status were 
construed and expressed or of how they influenced decision making by businessmen re-
mains rudimentary. The debate has in stead focused on the economic relevance of the 
aristocracy’s behavioural codes and value systems. 
The present article aims at better understanding status differentiation among ‘lower 
classes’ (humiliores) in general and businessmen in particular. The objective is twofold. 
On the one hand I will ask how economic profits could be transformed into social pres-
tige, on the other hand I will analyse the social conditions determining the efficiency of 
such strategies. I will argue that status enhancement was not determined solely by patron-
age, luck or exceptional talent, but was institutionalised through the numerous voluntary 
associations (collegia, corpora) throughout the empire. 
Social status in Roman society  
Roman social order was multi-dimensional with various coexisting social fields and com-
plex hierarchies. Status was measured by sets of different criteria, as birth, gender, 
wealth, education, ethnicity, skill, etc.2, each contributing to assigning specific social 
positions. 
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At the top – at the municipal, provincial and imperial level – stood the aristocracy, whose 
status was derived (collectively if not individually) from and was expressed by the con-
junction of different status criteria: wealth, education, political and/or religious functions, 
birth and so forth. Thus, when Cicero wanted to stress the respectability of Amyntas of 
Apollonis, he described him as genere, honore, existimatione, pecunia princeps. Sex. 
Roscius from Ameria was primus … genere, nobilitate et pecunia.3 
Viewed from above and afar social mobility led to status dissonance because the up-
wardly mobile gained prestige by some criteria (education, literary talent, wealth), but not 
by others. Typical examples were freedmen grown rich in business and former imperial 
slaves, whose servile descent excluded them forever from full membership of the aristoc-
racy.4 
Yet, if we focus on different social fields separately, the picture becomes more compli-
cated. A number of status criteria relate to distinct social fields – cultural, economic5, 
political – where they signify and measure different forms of real or symbolic assets. 
Thus in the cultural field eloquent orators or gifted authors rank higher than untalented 
ones; in the field of the commercial economy a wealthy and shrewd ship owner ranks 
higher than a poor captain; in the political field a former magistrate outranks a common 
senator or council member. 
The general pre-eminence of the aristocracy is not manifest within each social field sepa-
rately. A proper aristocrat was expected to be an educated and cultivated person, well 
versed in oratory, poetry and literature, but clearly not every aristocrat was a Tacitus or a 
Vergil.6 A proper aristocrat needed to be wealthy, but not every aristocrat was a Crassus 
and numerous aristocrats were in fact relatively poor compared to some freedmen upstarts 
who had made their fortune through trade and usury. Even in the traditionally aristocratic 
field of politics, the distribution of power and offices didn’t always match the pedigrees 
and expectations of the participants. Certainly in the empire many a nobleman was out-
ranked by ambitious and more able newcomers. 
Within the civic order, therefore, different social groups enjoyed prestige in different 
social fields without for that matter enjoying the general pre-eminence of the aristocracy. 
At sub-aristocratic level status was typically social field specific. Poets, orators and gram-
marians ranked high in the cultural field, but not necessarily in other fields. Successful 
businessmen ranked high in the economic field, enjoying the admiration of their (former) 
colleagues, but often not in the other fields. The challenge for the socially ambitious artist 
or businessman was to transgress the blurred borders separating social fields and to ac-
quire symbolic assets outside their ‘home’-field. 
Visibly closest to the aristocracy was the cultural elite, whom the aristocracy needed to 
acquire a ‘proper’ education and patronised and cultivated as a way to increase their cul-
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tural standing, but the step from being a successful and wealthy trader to becoming a 
respected member of the (municipal) aristocracy was often considerably smaller than that 
from being a poor but gifted grammarian to becoming a ‘gentleman’. 
Although Roman society was at heart aristocratic, it had a strong plutocratic bias.7 Wealth 
was an absolute precondition for social status and tended to produce the other require-
ments. A grand estate could be bought, an education could be acquired and political or 
religious offices could be obtained through generosity or corruption. Although achieving 
acceptance in the civic elite was often delayed to the next generation, the Roman aristoc-
racy was very open to wealthy newcomers compared to that of many other societies. 
Transforming wealth into social / symbolic assets 
But wealth in itself doesn’t generate social status. Like beauty, status lies in the eyes of 
the beholder and is socially and politically effective only when it is recognised and ac-
knowledged. Status claims have to be communicated and require an audience whose ex-
pectations determine the criteria to be met.8 The avaricious banker Chryseros in Appu-
leius’s Golden Ass was wealthy but ranked low on the status ladder because he hid his 
wealth.9 Status enhancement through success in business requires spending profits on 
prestige goods and conspicuous consumption, transforming economic assets into sym-
bolic assets signifying and claiming prestige and honour. Roman culture provided several 
ways to realise this transformation. 
The safest way was to invest in durable luxury or prestige goods, either real estate (villas, 
lavish town houses …) or commodities (gold and silver statuettes, table ware, expensive 
clothes ...). Economic capital was hereby immobilized but not lost. If necessary, luxury 
goods could be sold or used as security for loans. Thus, when Trimalcio’s ships were 
shipwrecked, his wife’s jewels provided the where-with-all to start anew.10 
A more hazardous way was to spend money on volatile goods and services as lavish 
meals or private shows. It was a risky strategy because the borderline between grandeur 
and prodigality was razor sharp. Quantitatively, private dinner parties – like Trimalcio’s – 
were the prime focus of such costly displays, but qualitatively privatly sponsored public 
banquets played a more prominent part, scoring high in the hierarchy of status signs.11 
Expenditure related to religious cults (sacrifices, altars, temples etc.), constituted another 
form of wealth display. Sometimes, these offerings were made on behalf of the commu-
nity or of a collegium (thus constituting forms of religious evergetism) but many more 
served ostensibly private purposes. Apart from epitaphs, religious inscriptions constitute 
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the most common type of inscription. The famous inscriptions for Nehalennia, all erected 
by merchants, provide an eloquent example.12 
Funerary monuments as well served to express and claim status.13 The grandiose monu-
ments in the Trier region14 or the monument of the baker M. Vergilius Eurysaces15 at 
Rome, provide extreme examples of a relatively common phenomenon, viz. that of con-
secrating a substantial part of one’s wealth – however modest – to the erection of a lasting 
tombstone. The monuments may be read as both expressing a family’s social position and 
attempting to perpetuate this position.The common practice of erecting one’s own funer-
ary monument (vivus fecit sibi …) served this purpose well. Most monuments were 
erected by the heirs, who had a more direct interest in the matter and – significantly – 
made sure that their names were properly recorded on the epitaphs. 
Although status affirmation through wealth display provided a potentially effective 
mechanism to signify and affirm status (particularly vis-à-vis one’s peers and socially 
inferiors) its effects were not straightforward. Wealth display itself was an intricate game, 
subject to the unwritten rules of taste and propriety. Failing these, wealth display signi-
fied wealth, but not status.16 
The major requirement for a proper use of wealth display lay in carelessness. Wealth had 
to be displayed in such a way that the owner seemed not to care. It had to strike others as 
a natural and inseparable by-product of being an aristocrat, not as an actively sought after 
strategy or (worse) as a way to fulfil private desires. Inappropriate or excessive wealth 
display amounted to luxuria, betraying an excess of importance attached to wealth.17 
‘Appropriate’ wealth display was conspicuously gender-bound. Whereas men’s indul-
gence in luxury manifested itself mainly at dinner parties, private shows, building pro-
jects and the purchase of works of art, women had a larger scope to indulge in personal 
luxury display. A bonus vir must not indulge in luxuria, not only because he is ‘bonus’, 
but more fundamentally because he is ‘vir’. ‘No offices, no priesthoods, no triumphs, no 
decorations, no gifts, no spoils of war can come to them; elegance of appearance, adorn-
ment, apparel – these are the woman’s badges of honour ; in these they rejoice and take 
delight; these our ancestors called the woman’s ornaments’.18 It allowed women to claim 
and display personal status and gave men the scope to display their fortune through their 
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wives ‘wearing heavy earrings worth as much as two or three patrimonies and clad in 
expensive and shamelessly transparent silk.’19 
Luxuria was of course a vice aristocrats could succumb to and ancient literature abounds 
with examples of aristocrats (or their wives) overstretching the urge to consume and show 
off. However, as an anti-quality we find it frequently associated with social upstarts as P. 
Vedius Pollio – son of a freedman, businessman, friend of Augustus and profiteer in the 
civil wars who achieved equestrian stratus and may at one time even have held an impe-
rial command20 – or the infamous Q. Remmius Palaemon – a former slave employed in 
his master’s textile workshop whose extraordinary talent as grammarian made him one of 
the wealthiest men of his time, investing in textile workshops and expert viticulture.21 
Tasteless luxury lies at the heart of the Trimalcio story, where we have a successful up-
start and former businessman – withdrawn from active trade, but still heavily engaged in 
money-lending – lavishly displaying his fortune at a private banquet. The effect (apart 
from being comical) is the opposite of what he strives to achieve; in stead of legitimising 
his integration into the elite, he underscores his principle exclusion.22 Needless to say, 
however, that in the eyes of his equally uneducated fellow upstarts and (no doubt) his 
socially inferiors Trimalcio’s luxury was impressive and effective. The story nicely illus-
trates how the effectiveness of status claims is determined by the audience for which they 
are intended. 
An alternative way to exchange economic for symbolic assets was through generosity. 
For the aristocracy generosity was a virtue of paramount importance. Aristotle and Cicero 
considered generosity as the justification for private wealth.23 However, at a much lower 
social level as well generosity was highly appreciated. The ox dealer M. Valerius Celer 
prides himself on his epitaph because he preferred to make himself well-deserving of 
others rather than to squander (his money).24 The businessman L. Licinius Nepos as well 
proudly proclaims on his epitaph that he had built sepulchral monuments for many of his 
friends.25 
Generosity in general and evergetism in particular was indissolubly linked to the Roman 
status system. Whereas investments in durable luxury goods were a relatively safe and 
easy way to achieve or express status, generosity implied the irreversible loss of substan-
tial material resources and therefore required stable and predictable institutions to opti-
mise and guarantee the symbolic assets to be gained. 
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The key towards achieving this lay in the strong reciprocity ethics of gift exchange ex-
pressed in the virtue of gratia. Ideologically, gratia was inherent in any Roman social 
relationship. It was a cohesive force structuring and strengthening social relations and 
facilitating the construction of social or personal networks.26 But, gratia was no meta-
physical force, and although it could powerfully contribute to establish and perpetuate 
social relations, it could not do so in a social vacuum.  
It has often been claimed that gift-exchange creates durable relationships, which even 
when they are highly instrumental, depend on trust and solidarity – what the Romans 
called fides. It is equally true however, that this process presupposes a social order and 
social institutions responsive to norms as gratia and fides. Roman friendship and patron-
age were such institutions, firmly placing gratia in a coherent ‘matrix’ of social norms 
and values as benevolence, trust, solidarity, affection, respect and honour.27 
Through gratia a person was capable to create and maintain social networks, that – apart 
from being instrumental in achieving political or other goals – had the potential of en-
hancing one’s social status ; hence the rituals of the salutatio or the adsectatio – the 
morning visits and escorts expected from clients and ‘lesser’ friends.28 Among humilio-
res, the visualisation of social networks was less rigidly structured. Partly, they could 
benefit from the same institution: being allowed at the salutatio or in the adsectatio of a 
nobleman was itself a token of esteem. We may assume, however, that even among the 
humiliores social networks were shown off. Mediterranean social life, on the agorai and 
the fora was very suitable for such subtle displays. 
Bestowing gifts and favours on friends, protégés and patrons had the advantage of creat-
ing or reinforcing social ties. It was important that one chose the right persons to gratify 
who would be willing and able to reciprocate in one way or another, but bearing this in 
mind, the benefactor could feel relatively secure that what he lost in material resources 
was gained in social resources. ‘What is given to friends is beyond the reach of Fortune. 
Only the wealth you will have given will you enjoy forever.’29  
When Cicero was hosted by the ‘expat’ businessman M’ Curius in Patras in 49 BCE, 
Curius seized the opportunity and wrote Cicero into his will. By chance, Cicero’s favour-
ite freedman Tiro fell ill and was forced to stay behind in the care of Curius, presenting 
another opportunity to win Cicero’s goodwill and friendship. It was to be the start of a 
fruitful patron client relation for Curius, who could now count on Cicero’s influence. 
Several letters of recommendation, written a few years later to the governor of Greece 
show that Curius’s hopes were not deceived.30 
The gains to be won from public generosity or evergetism – where the beneficiaries were 
not specific individuals with whom one could engage in relatively durable personal 
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friendships or patron client relations, but groups or entire communities – demanded a 
more complex social and institutional structure. 
The stage for public benefactions was set primarily by the city, whose institutions – mag-
istracies, priesthoods, and council – provided the necessary framework. The city council 
had a wide array of possibilities to enhance or affirm a benefactor’s status, including for 
instance honorific decrees, electing him city patron, setting up statues, conferring the 
ornamenta decurionum, and so forth. Municipal magistracies themselves were honores 
confirming and enhancing the magistrate’s social status, and promoting him into the ordo 
decurionum composing the city council. 
But the city was not the only collective body fit to enjoy benefactions. Numerous inscrip-
tions commemorate similar benefactions to private associations. Although the audience 
was different, the kinds of benefactions offered were conspicuously similar, ranging from 
distributions, over the erection of altars, to (re)decorating and building operations.31 
Businessmen could provide benefactions to the city community at large; following the 
example of the aristocracy whose natural social theatre was the city. Thus, the Cloatii 
brothers, who had settled as businessmen in Gytheion in the early first century BCE, were 
honoured by the city for coming to its aid financially.32 The North-Sea trader C. Aurelius 
Verus, received permission of the city council of Cologne to erect a public shrine or an 
altar in honour of Apollo.33  
However, businessmen could also choose to show generosity towards specific – mostly 
professional – associations.34 The wine merchant and skipper on the Saône, M. Inthatius 
Vitalis donated 10 sesterces a head to the members of the association of wine merchants 
based in Lugdunum when it erected a statue in his honour.35 The freedman clothesdealer 
L. Lupercius Excessus, active on transalpine routes in the first half of the second century 
and sevir augustalis of the Helvetii left over 10,000 HS to the guild of vestiarii at No-
varia.36 A marble slab from an anonymous Ostian association lists 24 benefactors who 
donated funds to the association for the celeabration of their birthdays.37 In Moguntiacum, 
a certain Optatius erected an altar in honour of Mercury and the Genius of the college of 
the negotiatores Pannoniarum (?) in 225 CE.38 
Before proceeding to survey and analyse the role of voluntary associations in status build-
ing it should be stressed that although conscious strategies can play a part in any of these 
‘status investments’, this is not necessarily always the case. Conspicuous consumption 
needn’t be motivated by anything other than the wish to conform to one’s perceived or 
desired social identity. Jewellery offered by a loving husband to his wife, needn’t be mo-
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tivated by anything other than a desire to show affection. Sincere religious convictions 
explain the most splendid temples and altars. Expensive funerary rites and monuments 
can play an important part in genuine mourning for a beloved and can help to embed 
death in a wider fabric of social and psychological meaning. Benefactions (public or pri-
vate) may be motivated by an honest concern for those on whom the benefactions are 
bestowed or simply by the feeling that being an aristocrat or desiring to become one im-
plies behaving as one. Significantly, sincerity is an implicit demand in even the most 
instrumental friendship.  
The effects, however, in terms of status enhancement are the same. In most cases the 
‘innocence’ (real or perceived) with which status expenditures are made adds to their 
effectiveness.39 The principles underlying the mechanisms by which economic assets may 
be transformed into social and symbolic assets are built into the foundations of Roman 
social life and – through primary and secondary (or anticipatory) socialisation – pro-
foundly shape the ‘habitus’ of Romans. Needless to say that the particular configuration 
of possibilities available to express status was prone to manipulation, but as always ma-
nipulation is possible only of norms and values enjoying a sufficiently strong support to 
move others in the direction desired by the manipulator. 
The associative order 
But, Roman status affirmation cannot be explained solely by looking at the available pos-
sibilities to express, claim or confirm status. We also need to look at the social structures 
and institutions organising the social space within which status positions were defined 
and assigned. I will argue that voluntary associations in general and professional associa-
tions in particular play a crucial role in shaping this social space. 
Historians of the ancient world tend to analyse social positions in general and social 
status in particular mainly in the framework of the prevailing ‘civic order’; a primarily 
politically oriented symbolic order dividing the population into different categories ac-
cording to their legal status and position towards the state and/or the city, each with its 
predefined privileges and duties: free versus slave, freeborn versus freed, citizens versus 
non-citizens, magistrates and former magistrates versus non-magistrates.40  
In taking this perspective scholars follow in the footsteps of ancient authors, whose bias 
towards the aristocracy is notorious. In their view, society is first and foremost divided 
into the aristocracy, or ‘honourable classes’ (honestiores), consisting of senators, knights 
and municipal council members and their families, and the ‘lower classes’ (humiliores), 
constituting the rest of the population.41 Although the formal separation between hones-
tiores and humiliores is first attested only in the second century CE, the underlying hier-
archical view opposing the aristocracy and its associates (mainly the cultural elite) to the 
rest of the ‘lower classes’ is much older. Research into the social status of businessmen 
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has accordingly focused on social exclusion and social mobility – the latter narrowly in-
terpreted as the chance of rising into the ranks of the honestiores.  
However, the humiliores were not the amorphous mass the elite authors present them to 
be and neither was the civic order the only symbolic order assigning social positions.42 
Below the surface of the divide between humiliores and honestiores flourished a complex 
social order with its own status differentiations, institutionalised through the numerous 
voluntary associations across the empire.  
Despite a wealth of studies on voluntary associations, studies of Roman social life pay 
only limited attention to them, restricting their role mainly to private concerns such as 
providing for decent burials, religious cults or plain simple socialising, having little im-
pact on overall social or economic life.43 
Lately this restrictive view has come under attack. On the one hand the economic dimen-
sion of professional associations as solidarity groups promoting the interests of their 
members is revalued.44 On the other hand, social historians are becoming increasingly 
aware of the importance of the associations in structuring social life.45 Besides function-
ing as solidarity groups assuring its members assistance in social and economic matters 
and providing access to patronage networks, the associations conferred status and social 
credibility upon their members.46 They assigned social positions distinguishing insiders 
from outsiders, leaders from followers, benefactors, patrons and so forth, creating a sym-
bolic social order of their own. 
The institutional framework of the collegia in many ways reflected that of the cities. 
Structural similarities between the associative and the civic order are easily found, mainly 
axed on the emphasis placed on hierarchy and honour. Like the city a collegium had mag-
istrates, patrons and a general assembly issuing decrees. Holding magistracy was consid-
ered an honour and required the payment of a substantial ‘honorary’ fee (summa hono-
raria). Their organisation was laid down in a charter called a lex. 
Yet in the articulation of the basic principles of hierarchy and honour, the associative 
order differed from the civic order. Whereas civic hierarchies were construed primarily at 
the elite level of the honestiores, relegating the rest of the population into the mass of the 
humiliores among which differentiation was limited to legal status and citizenship, the 
hierarchic principle of the associative order was operative almost exclusively at the level 
of the humiliores, among whom it created social distinctions that were largely irrelevant 
to the civic order. 
Thus for instance, freedmen were excluded from pre-eminent positions in the civic order, 
but they could rise through the ranks of private associations, achieving honourable and 
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influential positions in the associative order.47 Although the associations were organised 
hierarchically, with a general assembly and elected magistrates, important decisions were 
taken by the assembly of all members on the basis of the one man – one vote principle. 
Although the associations in any particular city honoured the city-gods and any special 
deities this particular city might favour, they also honoured their own special deities and 
Genius.48 Although the collegia honoured their city’s festivals and holidays, they super-
imposed their own calendar on that of the city, celebrating their own special days and 
festivals (the day they were founded, the anniversaries of their benefactors, the festival of 
their patron deity …)49, instituting a distinctive rhythm in the social life of their members. 
Thus, the collegia allowed non-aristocrats to find a place of their own in a symbolic order 
distinct from the civic order in which they could occupy only positions defined by inferi-
ority and exclusion.  
However, although the associative order was based on principles diverging from those 
underlying the civic order, the associations as such remained indissolubly linked to the 
civic order, playing a crucial crucial role in creating a civic identity for the humiliores.50 
Not only did the structure imposed by the associative order reflect that of the civic order; 
the associations were also an integral part of urban society, participating visibly and hon-
ourably in public banquets, festivals and ceremonies, assuring the practical organisation 
of religious processions and playing a crucial role in organising festivities determining 
the rhythm of city life, such as the ludi compitalicii.51 We find collegia receiving benefac-
tions and collegia collectively indulging in evergetism in accordance with public authori-
ties.52 The very fact that a number of associations received permission by public authori-
ties to erect honorary inscriptions in public places - a privilege usually reserved for the 
civic elites - testifies to their important symbolic role in city life.53 The importance of 
some associations to the city community was acknowledged by official honorific decrees, 
privileges and tokens of honour and esteem. 
The associations, moreover, created the conditions for institutionalised contacts between 
the civic elites and sub-elite groups. In these contacts the associations acted as corporate 
groups, enhancing the impact and social importance of their leaders. The collegia pro-
vided the business elites with the platform and social capital they needed to acquire pub-
lic esteem and in some cases to push through into the civic elites.54 Not coincidentally if 
we look at inscriptions of businessmen, we find that the business elite affirms its position 
and communicates its claims to social status mainly through the different degrees of be-
longing to a (mostly) professional collegium. 
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Conversely, the position of the civic elites as well was linked to the associative life in 
their cities. Thus, we find aristocrats patronising associations, and associations canvass-
ing for municipal elections and generally enhancing and visualising the dignity and pres-
tige of aristocrats by voting honorific decrees, statues and other tokens of esteem.55 
There is no doubt that the collegia contributed to the regeneration of the prevalent social 
order, serving as institutions (re)socialising and integrating outsiders or socially inferiors 
into civic life and preventing or channelling potentially dangerous tensions.56 Neverthe-
less, the associations’ role in social life cannot be reduced to this functionalist quality. 
The associations created a social environment with constraints and possibilities that for 
the vast majority of the population constituted the social order par excellence, forging 
social identities integrated into urban society but not derived from civic criteria.57  
This inherent ambivalence of the collegia was potentially dangerous and disruptive. Not 
coincidentally the imperial government closely monitored and regulated the activities of 
the collegia. After a fire had destroyed much of Nicomedia, the governor Pliny asked 
permission of the emperor to create a collegium fabrum to serve as a voluntary fire bri-
gade. He promised to monitor the collegium closely and to prevent anyone who was not a 
common workman (faber) to join the brigade. Trajan refused. Civil strife was endemic in 
the province of Bithynia and private associations often played a prominent part in it. The 
emperor feared that no matter how strict the precautions, the collegium would soon be-
come a political liability.58 Illegal collegia allegedly played a part in the rioting that broke 
out in Pompeii after a gladiatorial show under Nero.59 
In late Republican Rome, collegia serving as private militias had been a major factor in 
the political arena. In 64 BCE a senatorial decree banned all private associations. When 
the ban was lifted in 58, collegia-militias immediately re-emerged. Caesar again inter-
vened prohibiting all but the most ancient and respectable associations. Finally, an Au-
gustan lex Iulia de collegiis instituted a general ban on private associations except when 
licensed by the emperor and/or senate for public utility’s sake.60 Numerous imperial con-
stitutions and senatorial decrees were issued the following centuries, refining or modify-
ing the Julian law, but the basic principle of the law that collegia required a special li-
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cence was never abandoned. From the third century onwards associations were increas-
ingly subjected to government control.61 
However, at some time in the early Pincipate – perhaps already by the lex Iulia – an ex-
ception was created for tenuiores (‘the poorer’), who – apart from special religious occa-
sions – were allowed to convene once a month to collect contributions.62 The members of 
these collegia tenuiorum pooled resources from membership contributions, entry fees and 
summae honorariae imposed on their own magistrates. In addition they sometimes re-
ceived liberalities from patrons and benefactors. The money was intended primarily for 
feasting and for organising or embellishing the ‘club-members’ funeral. Although nothing 
excludes that occasionally it could have been used for social support in times of crisis63, 
the typical collegia-members (as we will see) were not normally in need of such support. 
Most collegia tenuiorum were nominally religious associations – as the collegium salu-
tare Dianae et Antinoi from Lanuvium, whose statutes are preserved. But no doubt a 
number of ‘professional’ collegia as well were in fact collegia tenuiorum.64 
The number of attested private associations is impressive. Ausbüttel estimated their total 
number in Italy and the Latin provinces at about 2,000 (two thirds of which in Italy). Of 
course not all of these were professional collegia. Many were religious associations; oth-
ers were simple neighbourhood clubs (like the collegia compitalicia). Soldiers sometimes 
sealed their comrade-ship by forming a collegium militare. Some collegia united slaves 
and freedmen of important families. Many escape classification.65 
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Waltzing collected 2,432 inscriptions recording what he considered ‘professional’ asso-
ciations, subdivided into 100 different types. About 1,500 inscriptions are still recognised 
today as referring to truly professional associations. In Pompeii alone at least 25 different 
professional collegia are documented by 41 inscriptions.66 
All shared the same basic objectives; to forge or reinforce mutual ties of solidarity by 
pooling resources for dining and wining67 and for ensuring members a befitting funeral.68 
But the level at which these activities were deployed and the degree to which they were 
integrated in public life (for instance through participation or organization of public ban-
quets and ceremonies) varied enormously. Some collegia also deployed activities of a 
different kind, ranging from voluntary fire fighting to assisting the annona – the imperial 
food supply system of Rome. 
Collegia in general were committed to the funeral rites of their members. This was not, as 
often claimed, because the collegiati were too poor to afford a decent burial. Membership 
of an association was in itself relatively expensive. Indirectly burial by or with assistance 
of a collegium, was an expensive option. Rather, the collegia contributed to adding lustre 
to the funeral of their members, affirming for the last time their social status, reflecting 
favourably on their family and heirs.69 
In the Greek and Roman Italian cities associations had a long history. In the western 
provinces associations gradually appeared as by-products of the Romanisation process. 
The glory period of private associative life is the Antonine and Severan era, when the 
collegia gained imperial recognition and privileges. 
Obviously not every association enjoyed the same esteem. The associations themselves 
were hierarchically related, according to their aims and size, and the wealth and influence 
of their members. 
At the top, outranking all other associations stood the collegia of the seviri augustales. 
Their members were for the most part wealthy freedmen, who were prohibited from hold-
ing magistracy or entering the city council. No doubt some augustales had been favourite 
freedmen of childless aristocrats inheriting their patron’s fortune, but a considerable 
number had their roots in various business enterprises.70 
Although theoretically the collegia augustalium were religious associations devoted to 
the emperor, in reality they were part and parcel of the city’s establishment. The dignity 
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of (sevir) augustalis was conferred by the city council and for wealthy freedmen the ordo 
augustalium served as an alternative for the ordo decurionum. A freedman who had en-
tered a college of augustales had gone as far on the social ladder as he could get. Since 
this paper is concerned with sub-aristocratic status we won’t go deeper into them. 
Immediately next in line, were collegia transcending the framework of individual cities, 
either because they were geographically active on a provincial or inter-provincial level, or 
because they were associated to the imperial annona. The typical examples are collegia 
of merchants or ship-owners.  
The corpus negotiatorum vinariorum Lugduni in cannabis consistentium controlled the 
wine trade in the Gallic and German provinces in the second and third century. It counted 
members of the municipal aristocracy and Roman knights in its ranks. Occasionally they 
combined their membership (or patronage) with that of other associations. An inscription 
from Lugdunum recording a handout situates their members below the ordo decurionum, 
but on a par with the local order of knights and the seviri augustales.71 Closely linked to 
the corpus vinariorum was the corpus nautarum Rhodanicorum et Araricorum in Lug-
dunum, whose members controlled shipping on the Rhône and Saône.  
C. Apronius Raptor, wine merchant and member of the city council of Trier was patron of 
the corpus vinariorum and of the corpus nautarum Araricarum.72 M. Inthatius Vitalis, 
wine merchant and barge skipper on the Arar, had been quaestor and twice curator of the 
corpus vinariorum. He was elected patron of the corpus nautarum Araricarum and of the 
(municipal) ordo equester, the seviri augustales, the utriclarii and the fabri at Lugdunum. 
The city council of Alba Helvorum granted him the right of consessum, i.e. to sit among 
them in public.73 Another member, whose name is lost, was curator of the corpus vinari-
orum and decurio ornamentarius in Nemausus.74 Another curator of the corpus vinari-
orum – likewise anonymous – was decurio ornamentarius in Nemausus, sevir augustalis 
in Nemausus and Lugdunum, and curator of the seviri augustales of the Lugduni in can-
nabis consistentes.75 
At Arles, associative life was dominated by a number of associations of seafaring skip-
pers (navicularii marini), who maintained close relations with the imperial annona. As 
the corpus vinariorum from Lugdunum the associations of navicularii at Arles main-
tained multiple links with other major corporations in Gaul and Spain. One of their presi-
dents, M. Frontonius Euporus was sevir augustalis at Aquae Sextiae and patron of the 
barge skippers on the Durance and of the utriclarii of Eruginum.76 
Another great corporation in the second century was the splendidissimum corpus merca-
torum Cisalpinorum et Transalpinorum controlling the land routes over the Alps. The 
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corpus had representatives in several provincial cities throughout the North-Western 
provinces and seems to have enjoyed senatorial protection. The families of some of its 
distinguished members made it into the Roman senate.77 
An unknown member of the association was elected patron of the collegium nautarum 
Comensium (uniting the skippers of lake Como and the Bodensee) in the second or early 
third century.78 M. Sennius Metilus from Trier, who presents himself as negotiator of the 
corpus without further specification, may have served as praefectus fabrorum tignuari-
orum in Lugdunum.79 An inscription from Aventicum mentions a (corpus) venaliciorum 
Cisalpinorum et Transalpinorum, possibly linked to the corpus mercatorum Cisalpi-
norum et Transalpiorum.80  
The magistrates of these associations were powerful and influential men whose involve-
ment in trade we know only because they were proud of the social status they enjoyed. 
They certainly moved at the fringes of the aristocracy and sometimes belonged to the 
municipal aristocracy. 
 
Some collegia maintained close relations with the imperial annona and the administration 
in the different provinces, who preferred to deal with corporations to arrange large scale 
transports, rather than with individual ship-owners or merchants. The precise relationship 
between both continues to be a subject of debate, and we should beware to generalise. 
Even if some of these associations were given special privileges, there is no reason to 
believe that this was invariably true for all. Neither is there any indication that the mem-
bers of these privileged corporations ceased to be private entrepreneurs. Skippers working 
for the annona received personal privileges and immunities, regardless of their member-
ship of any particular association.81 Nevertheless, the scale of these associations and the 
obvious wealth and influence of their leaders certainly entailed a special relationship with 
the administration.  
From Trajan onwards the annona urbis increasingly relied on private collegia to assure 
the regular food supply of Rome and to register the privileges enjoyed by individual busi-
nessmen. The repeated imperial decrees stipulating that membership of a corpus assisting 
the annona was no sufficient ground for receiving immunity, indicate that in practice 
membership was expected and almost automatically entailed immunity. In the third and 
fourth century this evolved into a more or less close government control over these vitally 
important corpora, but in the second century and early third century they fully retained 
their independence.82 
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The most typical and important associations in this category were those of the seafaring 
skippers (navicularii) and grain merchants, based in Ostia and other ports of major impor-
tance, like Arles, Carthage or Alexandria, whose corpora often had local bureaus at the 
Ostian ‘Piazzale delle Corporazioni’, harbouring 61 stationes belonging to various ‘inter-
national’ collegia.83 
But they were not the only ones. The corpus oleariorum ex Baetica, founded in the early 
second century, united wholesalers in Spanish olive oil active in the Gallic provinces, 
Italy and Rome. By the mid second century their contribution to supplying the Roman 
market was acknowledged and they enjoyed the same immunity as the corn merchants.84 
Not all of the associations serving the annona covered a geographically wide area. The 
association of bakers (pistores) in Rome was licensed by Trajan and its members were 
granted immunity in recognition for their contribution to the annona.85 Whether the asso-
ciations of barge skippers on the Tiber (the codicarii) and the auxiliary vessels used for 
operations in the port (lenuncularii), enjoyed similar privileges is not sure, but the possi-
bility shouldn’t be excluded.86 
The connection to the imperial annona boosted the prestige of these associations and 
gave them influence beyond the reach of any of its individual members. Thus, when the 5 
corpora of seafaring skippers of Arles felt unjustly treated by the procurator of Gallia 
Narbonnensis, they wrote a letter to the praefectus annonae threatening to withdraw their 
services. The praefectus annonae promptly responded by publicly calling the procurator 
to order.87 
Yet, the interregional associations and the associations serving the annona were hardly 
representative of the thousands of professional associations throughout the Empire, who 
were active only on the municipal level. Among these local associations, the colleges of 
fabri, centonarii and dendrophori took pride of place. They were closely associated to the 
civic order, serving as local fire brigades and perhaps ‘civic guards’, and – at least from 
the second century CE onwards – enjoyed imperial recognition and privileges. Their 
similarity in purpose is reflected by inscriptions distinguishing them as the tria collegia 
(principalia or splendidissima).88 Their practical use as fire-brigades (and civic guards?) 
has been questioned, but their public utility was generally acknowledged even by the 
imperial jurists. Accordingly, membership and magistracy entailed considerable status.89 
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The professional nature of these ‘fire-brigade associations’ has been questioned.90 The 
name dendrophori refers to the cult of Magna Mater. They were the bearers of the holy 
pine tree that was carried around in procession to commemorate the death of Attis. They 
are usually identified as being active in the wood trade but there is little to substantiate 
this.91 
The centonarii are mostly identified as dealers in second hand clothes or rags. Their name 
is derived from cento, a thick blanket patched together from old rags that was commonly 
used in fire fighting drenched in water or vinegar. The term centonarius is nowhere at-
tested in the sense of a dealer or producer of centones92 and the size of the collegia cen-
tonariorum in some cities is hardly compatible with membership being even ideally lim-
ited to ‘rag dealers’. This induced Kneissl to argue that centonarius simply denoted a 
‘fireman’.93 Nevertheless, some professional background – although not necessarily con-
fined to rag dealing – seems to be implied from an inscription found in Solva (Noricum) 
recording an imperial rescript, which should be read in conjunction with an excerpt from 
the third century jurist Callistratus. Both confine the privileges granted to members of 
collegia like that of the fabri (Callistratus) or the centonarii (Solva inscription) to those 
actually ‘engaged in the trade’ and not possessing more than a limited amount of 
wealth.94 
The associations of the fabri present themselves as professional collegia. Kneissl argued 
that they too were in fact nothing more than voluntary fire-brigades retaining the term 
fabri in their title merely for tradition’s sake. However, Pliny’s letter to Trajan proposing 
the institution of a collegium fabrum in Nicomedia suggests that at least preferably mem-
bership was limited to fabri.95 The double name of the association of fabri et centonarii in 
Milan also pleads against interpreting the collegia fabrum as wholly open associations. 
Callistratus explicitly names the corpus fabrum as an example of a collegium in which a 
person was accepted on the grounds of his trade (artificii sui causa).96 However, the ques-
tion remains what fabri did. The word faber in general denoted a craftsman of whatever 
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trade. Gaius notes that fabri tignuarii – ‘wood workers’ – referred not only to those who 
worked with wood, but to all construction workers.97 
It is tempting to identify the ‘core-members’ of the collegia fabrum and centonariorum 
with the two prime categories of urban workers in pre-industrial times: those engaged in 
the building trade and those engaged in the textile trade. The former having easy access to 
ladders, axes, carts etc., the latter having easy access to centones.98 But in the absence of 
better documentation, this is doomed to remain a hypothesis and in any case the collegia 
fabrum like the collegia centenoriarum and dendrophorum often accepted members from 
various professional backgrounds.99 
Whatever their professional background, the status of these collegia did not derive from 
their members’ professions, but from their role as voluntary fire brigades or ‘civic 
guards’. The acknowledged public importance of the ‘fire brigade associations’ consid-
erably enhanced the social status of their members and magistrates. In Lugdunum a 
freedman named Attalus, who was a perfume dealer (negotiator seplasiarius) and barge 
skipper on the Rhône, successful enough to become sevir augustalis, doesn’t omit his 
membership of the association of the corpus centonariorum Lugduni consistentium.100 
The grain merchant Toutius Incitatus as well was remembered as sevir augustalis in Lug-
dunum, barge skipper on the Arar, and magistrate of the centonarii at Lugdunum.101 
Apart from the ‘fire brigade associations’, a wealth of other local professional and reli-
gious colleges existed. In the smaller towns businessmen congregated in general profes-
sional associations, in larger cities associations showed a much larger degree of speciali-
sation.102 Thus, we hear of colleges of mule drivers (asinarii, muliones), stone cutters 
(lapidarii), fullers (fullones), fishermen (piscatores), salt merchants (salinatores), actors 
(scaenici), cattle dealers (pecuarii), gold smiths (aurifices) and so forth.103 The social 
standing of a particular collegium varied from city to city, but many show a sense of 
common identity and were capable to take common action if necessary. Pompeian graffiti 
shows that they were intensely active in electoral campaigns for municipal offices. 
In order to acquire respectability within the city community, a collegium (whether profes-
sional or religious) needed to assert and display its relative position in the social hierar-
chy.104 As in the case of individuals, social prestige could be affirmed through wealth 
display. A collegium had a common treasury and often possessed slaves and real estate.105 
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Most conspicuous were the club houses or scholae, the remains of which archaeologists 
continue to discover throughout the empire. The money for building and adorning the 
scholae was often donated by patrons or other benefactors.106 Sometimes, associations 
acted as public benefactors, mostly in religious contexts. Thus, in the late second or early 
third century, the association of the fabri dolabrariorum in Trier erected a temple in hon-
our of Deus Intarabus, associated with the Numina Augusta and their own Genius, with 
the explicit permission of the city council.107 
The case draws attention to the role of symbolic actions, signifying an association’s 
standing. Scores of inscriptions erected by collegia honour emperors, gods, patrons, pub-
lic benefactors or city magistrates. These monuments not only serve as manifests of pub-
lic allegiance, but also as claims to legitimacy. By setting them up, the collegia asserted 
that their opinions mattered and that they were able to confer status on civic leaders. By 
granting (some) associations the right to erect these monuments in public places, the city 
council in turn acknowledged their claims. Likewise, the electoral propaganda conducted 
by collegia, not only increased a candidate’s chances of being elected, but also signified 
the association’s claim to legitimacy and respect.108 
Through evergetism, honorific decrees, electoral support and public performances at pa-
rades or processions the associations confirmed and claimed their special position in ur-
ban society, manifesting their attachment to the civic order, but also their principle inde-
pendence from the civic institutions. Not surprisingly, the public authorities were both 
apprehensive about the associations and eager to promote them.109 
Some associations received privileges or tokens of honour from the imperial government 
because they fulfilled an essential function for the state. Thus, by the third century the 
members of all explicitly licensed associations of artisans (in quibus artificii sui causa 
unusquisque adsumitur) were exempted from public duties (munera) because they as-
sured a necessariam operam publicis utilitatibus.110 
At the municipal level, privileges and tokens of esteem were common. The corporation of 
the nautae Atr(icae ?) et Ovidis had 25, the nautae Rhodanicorum et Araricorum 40 re-
served seats in the theatre of Nemausus.111 Some handouts were conspicuously more gen-
erous towards members of (some) collegia than towards the rest of the citizens. In Urv-
inum Mataurense (Umbria), the city-patron Vesnius Vindex distributed 20 HS to each of 
the decuriones, 16 HS to members of the collegia and 12 HS to the plebs. In Lupiae the 
father of a deceased city patron raised a fund out which annual distributions were to be 
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financed of 20 HS a head for the decuriones, 12 HS a head for the augustales, 10 HS a 
head for the association of mercuriales and 7 HS a head for the rest of the people.112 
The distinctive criterion of the associative order was membership. Contrary to citizen-
ship, membership of an association - at least until the third c. CE - was limited and sub-
ject to approval. In some collegia new members had to be accepted by the general assem-
bly, in others admission was in the hands of the presidents.113 Although presumably the 
small local collegia set few conditions on membership beyond common professions or 
residence in the same neighbourhood, membership always distinguished ‘ins’ from 
‘outs’.114  
Membership allowed a person to participate in the prestige enjoyed by his association. 
The more prestigious an association was, the more honour its members derived from it. 
Even the most humble associations demanded relatively substantial financial contribu-
tions from their members and favoured the ‘better’ to do. The more important a collegium 
was, the more exclusive and expensive membership became. Accordingly, the typical 
professional collegium did not consist of employees, but of employers and owners or 
managers of workshops, ships and other capital goods.115 The rank and file of the collegia 
was composed of what Veyne called the plebs media; ‘working-class’ people, making 
enough money to cover living expenses and in addition to engage in social activities such 
as college membership, but hardly enough to live in luxury.116 
It doesn’t follow that membership of a collegium was exceptional. Although many ex-
pressly mention having been magistrates of a collegium, membership alone is rarely men-
tioned unless in the case of outsiders, whose membership was mostly honorary, or some-
times in the case of ‘fire brigade associations’.117 Although membership of a professional 
association was not required to set up a business venture, it is unlikely that many inde-
pendent tradesmen would have preferred to forego the protection of a collegium. Egyptian 
papyri suggest that non-members could be given a hard time.118 The example of the col-
lege of cultores Dianae in Lanuvium, combining a very high entry fee (100 sesterces plus 
an amphora of good wine) with a very modest monthly contribution (5 asses) shows that 
the threshold for membership could be set high while the actual cost of membership was 
kept low.119  
MacMullen believes that in the second century up to a third or more of the urban male 
population was member of some collegium.120 The few membership lists that are pre-
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served are impressive. Not surprisingly the ‘fire brigade’ associations’ stand out. The 
association of fabri et centonarii in Milan was divided into 12 centuriae, each composed 
of 10 decuriae.121 In Rome the tenth decuria of the fabri tignuarii alone numbered 22 
members and it was only one of 60 such decuriae. Over a thousand members of various 
collegia are recorded in Ostia and Portus in the late second and early third century. In 
Portus the corporation of shipbuilders (fabri navales) counted 353 members in the Sev-
eran period. The corporation of fabri tignuarii of Ostia counted approximately 350 mem-
bers. The guild of the lenuncularii tabularii (operating auxiliary vessels in the harbour) 
counted 258 members in 192 CE, the lesser guild of the lenuncularii pleromarii counted 
only 24 members in 200. The association of fullers in Ostia numbered less than 50 in 232 
CE.122 In Bovillae, the association of the scaenici (performance artists) numbered 60 
members in 167 CE.123  
Some professional associations accepted members of other trades and many of the non-
professional associations counted important or less important businessmen among there 
members.124 Associations of fabri are conspicuous in this respect. No doubt their public 
role as fire brigades / civic guards made similarity of profession less an issue.125 Yet, 
other colleges as well sometimes accepted outsiders into their ranks. The collegium 
harenariorum in Modena counted a linen merchant (negotians lanarius) in its ranks.126 
Popillius, a citizen from Lugdunum but in origin a Sequanus who was a producer and 
trader of wool (negotiator artis prossariae) proudly affirms both his membership (adper-
tinens) and magistracy (honoratus) of the college of the utriclarii in Lugdunum.127 In 
Ostia the college of the Adriatic sea merchants coöpted into its ranks free of charge, Cn. 
Sentius Felix, president of the curatores navium marinarum and patron of 15 other colle-
gia.128 
Nevertheless, in most cases access was preferably limited to persons exercising the same 
or similar professions. The statutes of a collegium of ivory and citrus wood workers in 
Rome expressly forbade its curatores to enlist anyone who was not either an eborarius or 
a citriarius.129 Pliny promised that he would see to it that only fabri would be enlisted in 
the collegium fabrum, he wanted to establish in Nicomedia.130 Callistratus notes that the 
immunity from public duties granted to the members of collegia into which one was ad-
mitted on the grounds of one’s professional status was limited to members who actually 
exercised that profession. The passage confirms that outsiders could be accepted as mem-
bers, but it also indicates that this was not normally the case and we may infer that the 
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exceptions were motivated mainly by the immunity that could be won by becoming a 
member.131 
Collegia were not egalitarian societies. A rigid hierarchy was maintained, modelled on 
the cities’ political institutions. However, the hierarchy within associations differed in 
one essential respect from the civic hierarchies. All members of a collegium enjoyed the 
principle right to ascend in the association’s hierarchy.132 
The organisation of a particular collegium could vary. Usually, however, at the top stood 
magistri, elected for 3 or 5 years (quinquennales). Below these we often find curatores 
and sometimes treasurers (quaestores, arcarii). The higher one rose in the hierarchy, the 
more prestigious one’s position. Like the city magistrates, their offices were considered 
honores and usually entailed considerable expenses; a summa honoraria would be re-
quired when they entered office, as well as financial contributions to the association’s 
activities. A former magistrate remained honoratus.133 
We often find these men accumulating elevated positions in various associations with 
other status positions and tokens of prestige. Some served as public officials (appari-
tores).134 A good example is M. Licinius Privatus, originally an ordinary member of the 
corpus fabrum tignuariorum of Ostia, elected quinqennalis for 200-204. After donating 
50,000 sesterces to the city of Ostia, the council gave him the honorary title of bisellarius 
(including a seat of honour in the theatre), and later the ornamenta decurionatus. In the 
mean time, he had been appointed scriba decurialis (the highest apparitorial office) in 
Rome. Subsequently, he was accepted into the corpus pistorum Ostiensium et Portus (the 
corporation of bakers), which outranked the corpus fabrum because it was associated 
with the imperial annona.135 Here too he was elected first to the office of quaestor then to 
that of quinquennalis. Ultimately, the collegium fabrum tignuariorum of Ostia erected a 
statue with an inscription in his honour, for which the city council provided a public 
place. Although Privatus never pushed through into the city council (probably because he 
was of servile descent), his sons and grandsons were duly accepted in the council and 
eventually acquired the dignity of equites Romani.136 
The pearl-dealer Tuticius Hylas was quinquennalis perpetuus of the collegium dendro-
phorum in Rome, to which he donated 10,000 sesterces for the yearly celebration of his 
birthday, and became a member of the (distinguished) corps of ‘consular Messengers’ 
(decuria viatoria consularis).137 The fuller T. Sillius Priscus was magister and quaestor 
of the sodalicium fullonum in Falerio, and twice magister and twice quaestor of the col-
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legium fabrum. His wife became mater of the sodalicium fullonum, while his two sons 
became magistri and quaestores of the collegium fabrum.138 
Ranking highest on the ‘associative’ status ladder were patrons of collegia.139 A patron 
was expected to lend assistance in legal matters, but he was primarily an intermediary for 
dealings with higher authorities, other associations and generally anyone with whom his 
client-collegium desired to have dealings. When a collegium elected someone as patron it 
enhanced his reputation greatly because it signified and thereby affirmed and enforced the 
influence and status he enjoyed. Most patrons of collegia were members of the municipal 
aristocracy, some were Roman knights or senators. However, a small but conspicuous 
number had risen from the ranks of the business community. Not surprisingly, they 
emerge mainly in commercial centres like Lugdunum or Arles in Gaul or Ostia in Italy, 
while elsewhere patronage over associations is mostly limited to members of the civic 
elites.140 
A famous example is the Narbonne based Sex. Fadius Secundus Musa, patron of the col-
legium fabrorum subaedianorum and grand scale dealer in Spanish olive oil and/or garum 
whose amphorae were found on the Monte Testaccio in Rome. In 149 CE, he was hon-
oured by the fabri subaediani with a statue in a public place accorded by the city council 
and in turn showed his thanks by donating 15,000 sesterces to the collegium, out of the 
proceeds of which yearly festivities and distributions were to be financed.141 
The career of C. Sentius Regulianus, a wine and oil merchant and a barge skipper on the 
Arar provides another example. He became curator and patron of the corpus vinariorum 
Lugduni in canabis consistentium, curator of the corpus oleariorum ex Baetica and pa-
tron of the corpus nautarum Araricarum. His career eventually brought him to Rome 
where he was granted equestrian status and served the annona as diffusor olearius.142  
Ti. Claudius Severus rose through the ranks of the association of fishermen and divers on 
the Tiber (corpus piscatorum et urinatorum totius alvei Tiberis), becoming thrice presi-
dent (quinquennalis) before being elected patron. He acquired an apparitorial post as lec-
tor decurialis in Rome. In 206 CE, he placed statues of the emperor and his mother as 
well as of himself in the association’s club house and donated a fund of 10,000 sesterces 
to the association, the proceeds of which were to be distributed yearly among its mem-
bers.143 
The sea skipper M. Frontonius Euporus, was sevir augustalis at Aquae Sextiae, curator of 
the association of navicularii marini at Arles, and patron of the nautae Druenticorum and 
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of the utriclarii corporati from Ernaginum.144 The Ostian based corn merchant M. Iunius 
Faustus was patron of the associations of the African and Sardinian skippers.145 
With businessmen as patrons we have come to the top of the social hierarchy in the asso-
ciative order. At this level associative hierarchies interlock with civic hierarchies; we find 
businessmen being honoured by the city council, being co-opted into the council or re-
ceiving the ornamenta decurionatus, achieving municipal magistracies and sometimes 
gaining equestrian rank. Among freedmen, membership of the college of seviri au-
gustales (who were appointed by the city council) is frequent. 
Sex. Fadius Secundus Musa, whom we mentioned as patron of the collegium fabrorum 
subaedianorum, was a prominent member of the city council, had been elected to all 
regular magistracies and was appointed curator primus of the temple of Augustus. The 
corn dealer M. Iunius Faustus, whom we mentioned as patron of the associations of Afri-
can and Sardinian skippers in Ostia, had likewise built a splendid political career in Ostia, 
being co-opted into the city council before being elected duumvir. He was furthermore 
appointed priest to the deified Titus (flamen divi Titi) and priest of the cult of Rome and 
Augustus (flamen Romae et Augusti).146 
How representative they were of their ‘class’ is impossible to tell. The inscriptions are not 
very helpful. The question we need to ask is not how many aristocrats admit being or 
having been in business, but how many aristocrats remaining silent about their economic 
interests, had a background in business. This is a question the inscriptions by definition 
are unable to provide an answer to.147 
The hierarchies of the associative order were publicly expressed and displayed. Patrons, 
magistrates and former magistrates were rewarded by visible tokens of honour; seats of 
honour were reserved for them at banquets, larger portions were given them, honorific 
decrees were voted, busts and statues of them were erected in club houses. Fasti going 
back several generations were drawn and inscribed listing the names of the honorati.148 
Depending on the public importance of the associations in question, the cities joined in by 
conferring privileges or public tokens of esteem.  
As in the case of the civic order, the honorific nature of magistracies in the associative 
order and the symbols and ceremonies attached to their duties, express and constitute the 
symbolic capital acquired by them. Not coincidentally the costs involved in the collegia’s 
activities, both internal (communal meals, maintenance of the club house, …) and exter-
nal (participation in festivities and ceremonies in honour of the city gods, participation in 
electoral propaganda, …), were largely financed by the fees and benefactions of their 
honorati and patrons, who were expected to show generosity towards their colleges, both 
freely (ob liberalitatem) and – for magistrates – as an inherent part of their function (ob 
honorem). Thus, the collegia set the stage for a legitimate and legitimising display of 
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wealth, both by demanding considerable monetary contributions and by creating solidar-
ity groups capable of receiving collective benefactions. 
In the associations successful businessmen could achieve positions of leadership and es-
teem. It was primarily here that they could transform their economic capital in social and 
symbolic capital, eventually allowing them or their children to join the ranks of the aris-
tocracy.149 The associations institutionalised social mobility, laying out a clear trajectory 
for the upwardly mobile. An ambitious businessman knew precisely what to do and 
which norms to conform to in order to rise (eventually) into the aristocracy itself. 
Moreover, the benefits gained by acquiring symbolic assets in the associative order, were 
not only immaterial. Collegia were relatively durable organisations, able to muster con-
siderable social resources, ranging from manpower to conduct or to suppress social re-
volts to quid-pro-quo contacts crossing social and geographical borders. Access to these 
resources depended on the position one occupied within the associative order.  
Ethos and mentality 
In studying economic mentality, scholars have mostly focused on elite-values, which are 
relatively well documented. The concept of ‘anticipatory socialisation’ has been a popular 
duck hole to argue for the applicability of elite values to understand the behaviour of 
traders and financiers. However, elite values are only of limited use to understand eco-
nomic decision making by ‘entrepreneurs’. 
If we want to understand the working of Roman business practices, the ethos and values 
of Roman businessmen need to be studied in their own right.150 Methodologically, this is 
difficult because the values and opinions of business circles were never systematised or 
transformed into a recognisable ideology. The ‘ethos’ of Roman businessmen never 
transgressed the level of non systematised – sometimes even non conceptualised – dispo-
sitions. In order to understand this ‘ethos’ one needs to understand the psychological dis-
positions of businessmen, their viewpoints on themselves and others, on their social envi-
ronment, the social fields in which they operated, on their actions, motives and objec-
tives; in short we should be looking for the specific habitus of businessmen and how it 
was formed.  
Needless to say this issue is far too complex to be treated as an annex to what I have here 
called ‘the associative order’ or the different procedures of status-affirmation. Neverthe-
less, the effects of the associations and the symbolic order they generated on the forma-
tion of this ‘ethos-habitus’ is too large to ignore. 
The associations constituted the prime social framework within which businessmen lived 
and operated. To a large extent they moulded the social geography within which social 
positions at sub-aristocratic level were assigned, acquired and changed. Thus, the institu-
tional structures of the associations and of their symbolic order were where the ethos-
habitus of businessmen was formed.151 
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This was further facilitated because the associations were ‘corporate’ groups – with 
clearly defined membership criteria, common purposes, common actions, collective iden-
tities, etc. – constituting recognisable solidarity groups able to exert social pressure on its 
(would-be) members. By doing so they bridged the gap between class identity – by which 
a person is identified through impersonal categorical tags such as negotiator, curialis, 
arator etc. – and group identity – by which a person is identified as member of a distinct 
social group. As such they played an important part in the regeneration of value systems, 
proper to that specific social group and class. 
The hierarchic structure of the associations and the emphasis placed on honour and the 
display of honour within the associations reflected the situation in Roman society at large 
and helped to perpetuate the system. This is obvious when we look at the interaction be-
tween the associations as institutions upholding the associative order, and the cities and 
imperial administration as institutions upholding the civic order. The privileges accorded 
by municipal and imperial administrations reflected and created a hierarchy between the 
associations and thereby within the associative order itself. 
At the same time, however, the associative order was much more ‘democratic’ than the 
civic order. The general assembly of an association’s members remained the ultimate 
legislative and elective body of the group, in which any man’s vote weighed as much as 
that of any other. Private wealth and the willingness to spend it on community (i.e. the 
association’s) purposes were the sole requirement for ascending the association’s hierar-
chy. 
The associative order imbued its members not just with a desire to attain honour by 
spending private means on the community (i.e. to change economic assets for symbolic 
assets), it also created an open link between wealth and honour, justifying and encourag-
ing the desire to make money and allowing successful businessmen to attain positions of 
honour and influence in ways that were deemed ‘sordid’ by the aristocracy and its cul-
tural satellites.  
Eventually, no doubt, most of these self-made men, like Trimalcio, followed Cicero’s 
advice and withdrew from active involvement in trade or finance, reinvesting their for-
tune in country estates. By then, however, they had left their mark in fasti, statues, honor-
ific decrees, altars and so forth, decorating the scholae of associations as well as public 
buildings throughout the city, confirming and justifying their course of life and showing 
the way to others: salve lucrum ! 
Koenraad Verboven 
FSR Postdoctoral Research Fellow 
Ghent University (Belgium) 
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